Iranian involvement in rabbi’s murder in Dubai: a new step in IRGC terror

According to Israeli media reports, the abduction and murder of the Chabad rabbi Zvi Kogan was perpetrated by a terrorist squad of Uzbek origin that operated in Dubai on behalf of Iran and allegedly fled to Turkey.

While Israel has not yet officially accused Iran of involvement in the terrorist act, according to the Associated Press, western officials believe Tehran runs intelligence operations in the UAE. They keep tabs on over half a million Iranians living across the country and, of course, monitor the Israeli presence in the Emirates.

Iranian agents have been implicated in various activities within the UAE, including espionage, abductions, and illicit financial operations. In one of the most recent cases, in July 2020, IRGC agents abducted German-Iranian citizen Jamshid Sharmahd from a hotel in Dubai while he was waiting for a layover flight. Later, this dissident was killed in Iranian jail.  

A number of businessmen accused of funding terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas were making substantial profits through property investments in Dubai, according to The Times. Despite facing sanctions, these individuals acquired properties worth millions, demonstrating the existence of Iranian-linked financial networks in the UAE. The U.S. Treasury Department also sanctioned UAE-based companies acting as sales agents for Iranian metals, highlighting the use of the UAE's financial system to circumvent sanctions. 

 But the case with the abduction and murder of Rabbi Kogan is different. 

If the perpetrators are really hired Uzbek citizens, this constitutes a new threat. Never before had the IRGC—the main organizer of all Iranian terrorist activity—recruited Uzbeks for such purposes. 

The IRGC has been involved in recruiting individuals from various countries to support its activities, notably Afghan Shiites for the Fatemiyoun Brigade (associated with Hezbollah Afghanistan) and Pakistani Shiites for the Zainabiyoun Brigade, both active in the Syrian conflict.

Iran has been implicated in using foreign nationals to carry out attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets globally. For example, Azerbaijan is one of the most recurring sites where the IRGC tries to commit such terrorist attacks. In 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022, the local security service DTX neutralized and apprehended mixed groups of terrorists, comprising both local and foreign citizens (such as Lebanese). Most of them were trained in Iran to gather intelligence and carry out attacks on Israeli and sometimes other Western embassies. 

In March 2023, an Iranian agent tried to murder Azerbaijani MP Fazil Mustafa, known for his staunch support for strengthening relations with Israel. An Afghani citizen received a 10-year sentence last month for his attempt to attack an Israeli embassy in July 2023.

In October 2021, Cypriot authorities arrested a Russian-Azerbaijani national suspected of planning attacks on Israeli businessmen in Cyprus. He was using Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus both for terrorism objectives and as an operational and transit area. At least two Pakistani citizens also assisted the perpetrator. 

In June 2022, Turkish authorities arrested several individuals, including Iranian nationals, accused of plotting to kidnap and assassinate Israeli tourists.

In November 2022, Georgian security services thwarted an Iranian plot to assassinate an Israeli businessman in Tbilisi. The plan involved a Pakistani hit squad hired by IRGC.

In March 2023, Greek police detained two Pakistani nationals for planning attacks on a Jewish restaurant and a synagogue in Athens. An Iranian handler directed the suspects and promised financial compensation for each casualty. 

At the beginning of 2024, IRGC plotted to attack key Jewish centers in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, using a Tajik national.

So, the IRGC recruited Afghani, Pakistani, Turkish, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Tajik, and Indian nationals, but not the Uzbek ones. 

In contrast, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has actively recruited Uzbeks to fight in Afghanistan. Reports indicate that ISKP has expanded its social media efforts in the Uzbek language to attract recruits from Central Asia.

ISKP and Iran are pretty hostile towards each other. In January 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility for twin bombings in the Iranian city of Kerman, Iran, during a ceremony commemorating Qasem Soleimani, resulting in at least 95 fatalities. Iranian authorities have responded by arresting individuals linked to ISKP. In August 2024, Iran's Intelligence Ministry announced the detention of 14 ISKP members, alleging their involvement in planning attacks within the country. 

It is highly improbable that the IRGC and ISKP have found a common ground and cause. It is much more probable that the Corp’s emissaries have found the way to recruit representatives of a tiny (between 200,000-300,000 people) Uzbek Shia minority, living in Bukhara and Samarkand. Their existence is hardly common knowledge in the Arab and Western worlds, thus making Uzbek IRGC agents less visible and identifiable. 

Thus Israel and the West should be ready for a new challenge: the use of agents from ethnic and religious minorities that weren’t connected to terrorist organizations previously and, in effect, are not as well-researched as garden-variety terrorists of the times that passed.